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MODERATOR: GEORGE A. LOPEZ
SPEECH: "CONTEMPORARY DEVELOPMENTS IN THE IN-
TERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF THE RIGHTS OF
MINORITIES"
DATE: MARCH 1, 1991
Professor Lopez: I would like us to first address the questions Hurst
issued to us at the end of his talk. First, is there any real differ-
ence between group rights and individual rights? Second, should
there be legally binding norms, and should they be universally
binding? The floor is open.
Participant: I would like to address the second question by direct-
ing your attention to something which is going on in the Council
of Europe, which you could not be aware of since it is not yet
public. The Council came out a few weeks ago with a preliminary
draft for the European Convention for the Protection of Minori-
ties. That would be, then, the first positive international law con-
vention in that field. It is based on the Copenhagen Document,
which you explained to us, and the Charter of Paris of November
1990, and it concerns only what is usually called "internal self-
determination." There is even a clear statement that minorities
should stay more or less within the state in which they live and
that the principle of territorial integrity should be observed. A
minority group, for the purposes of the Convention, is a group
which is smaller in number than the rest of the nationals of the
state, whose members, although nationals of that state, have eth-
nic, religious, or linguistic features different from those of the rest
of the population. These objective criteria are guided by the will
to safeguard different cultures, traditions, religions, and languages.
This is really drawn from the Copenhagen Document, which is a
blend of group rights and individual rights-namely, rights of
minorities as groups and of individuals belonging to minority
groups. Such rights include the right to existence and, in particu-
lar, the right to education in one's mother tongue-the right to
use language. There is" no provision for the right to political par-
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ticipation. There is only a very weak provision stating that states
should keep in mind, when looking at the political and adminis-
trative structure of the state, that there are minorities.
Maybe the most interesting part of the convention is that
there is a control machinery. There will be a committee on the
protection of minorities. There will be a reporting system like
there is in the United Nations, the success of which will depend
upon specific declarations by the various member states. The com-
mittee then will be able to draft a report and present it to the
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe. It will be open
for member states of the Council of Europe and other European
states.
This brings me back to the answer to your question. I think
yes, there should be legally binding norms. However, as regards
minorities, I am hesitant to believe that they should work on a
universally binding level. For minority protection, even more than
for other general human rights, I think that the regional approach
is the only viable solution.
Professor Hannum: I think you are right that Europe will adopt
something in the near future. I forgot to mention that the Copen-
hagen meeting recommended that the CSCE states have a confer-
ence specifically on minority rights. That conference will be con-
vened in Geneva in July. It is unclear whether they will actually try
to draft a convention or declaration at that meeting, but they well
might, particularly with this much work having been done by the
Council of Europe. I think it is likely that Europe will come up
with something. It will be interesting to .see whether or not there
are differences between eastern and western Europe on this partic-
ular issue. In any event, Europe has to be very careful about what
it says; even though the proposed convention will be a European
regional document, it will be read by minorities all over the world.
There is a fine line between protecting minority rights and
encouraging separatism. It does not surprise me that the docu-
ment is very clear in its rejection of secession. That may be the
price that Europeans and the rest of the world will have to pay
for any document that addresses the substance of minority con-
cerns. With all respect to Professor Chen, I think that self-deter-
mination would be better off forgotten in this context, as opposed
to being heralded as the paradigm of human society-even though
I agree that, in a nonlegal sense, it is.
[Vol. 66:1451
HANNUM DISCUSSION
Participant:. If you are not going to build on self-determination, can
you give me some idea of what the organizing principle will be?
Professor Hannum: I am willing to concede, although I do not think
it is the case in the real world, that consent of the governed
should not be the basic source of legitimacy for the state. But who
are "the governed"? If we look at Northern Ireland, for example,
who is the state? Which is the legitimate state? If you let me draw
the borders, I can create as many legitimate states as you would
like.
The focus on minority rights is in many ways antithetical to
the principle of democracy. Why should Italians or Chinese or
Catholics have special rights, but not Republicans and Democrats
and Socialists? There are many countries in which there is a per-
manent -political minority; it is often territorially dispersed rather
than regionally concentrated, but it is as effectively excluded from
power as some of the ethnic groups that we are talking about.
Unless one is going to assign a very high value to the preservation
of a group simply because it exists, focusing on consent of the
governed is not going to advance us very far.
I think we have to take the state structure as it exists and
work within it. We need not necessarily do so by opposing seces-
sion in every instance, but we should at least admit that secession
is not a legal concept. The protection of minority rights can be a
legal concept, in the same way that the protection of human
rights is, in that we can begin to draw narrow lines around issues
like education and language. I am optimistic about the future of
autonomous and regional arrangements which encourage political
development, decentralization, and devolution, without pretending
that any group has very many rights just because it is a group.
Participant You said you had two points. I did not understand the
first point, the distinction between the denial of the right to self-
determination of nations and, for example, the situation in Yugo-
slavia and the Baltic republics. There we really have a denial of
the right to establish an historic nation which, at this particular
time, does not have the state structure it would like to iave.
The second point, protection of the minority by naion states,
I think you explained pretty well. However, I would like you to ex-
pand more, if you can, on the distinction between ethnic groups
and national minorities. For me, those are not the same things. I
was perfectly happy with the legal provisions explanation that you
1991]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
gave for ethnic groups, but I did not hear anything on national
minorities. Could you please explain that?
Professor Hannum: The concept of "national minorities" seems to
me to be something that only Europeans can explain. It is a con-
cept that is very much founded in the last century of European
history, and it does seem to include nations, as you call them,
with a certain historical and territorial content. It is not necessarily
applicable to all ethnic or all cultural or all religious groups. It
may be that this is the meaningful distinction: that one can devel-
op a convention or declaration for Europe which will talk about
national minorities and may give them a somewhat larger scope of
political rights than a universal declaration might, which perhaps
could be restricted to ethnic, religious, and linguistic minorities
which do not quite rise to the level of nations.
Having said that, I am not at all happy with it. There are
probably between 1,000 and 5,000 "nations" in the world. There
certainly are at least several hundred indigenous nations in this
hemisphere. They are not national minorities, but they certainly
are nations, and I think that to pretend we can resolve these con-
flicts by trying to decide who is a nation and who is a people is
really pretty silly. One needs to focus much more specifically on
what the group needs to protect itself, and that, I think, is an
area where human rights and the formulation of legal obligations
is appropriate. The focus should not be on what kind of power
the group wants. Lots of groups want power. Unless it is necessary
for their cultural survival, an ethnic group has no more right to
political power than a political group does.
Participant: I was intrigued by Arthur Rosett's question. You are
drawing attention to the contradiction between democracy and
protection of minority rights. However, doesn't it beg the question
of how one defines democracy? I mean, there are many concep-
tions of democracy. I make reference in particular to Professor
Steiner's remarks when he pointed out that the coalitions in cer-
tain groups are excluded from coalitions in systematic ways every
time. It seems that one can make an argument that it is consistent
with democratic theory to protect their rights, or for some other
kinds of mechanisms to protect their rights. There is a




Professor Hannum Well, first you are assuming that a group like
Irish Catholics is somehow worthy of recognition and somehow
deserves special participation in the state, as opposed to groups
like Democrats or Republicans, which simply lose power sometimes
and win power sometimes because we switch groups easily. The
democratic theory does not posit the existence of minori-
ties-unchanged, immutable minorities-that are permanently
excluded from power, unless they are political minorities. For in-
stance, I doubt that communism is going to come to power in the
United States. And, in fact, we have actually assured that that will
not be the case.
To define the state, you choose your minority and your major-
ity. For example, consider Britain and Ireland. For a long time,
the two islands were one state. That is perfectly fine. There is
nothing wrong with that. Indonesia consists of hundreds of islands.
The state could be each island separately. The states could be
Scotland, Wales, England, and Ireland. Northern Ireland could be
independent, or it could be part of something else. How can you
say that Catholics in Northern Ireland, who have lived in a system
that was perfectly democratic for the last seventy years, have any
special rights if they are guaranteed not to be discriminated
against, but protected. Where does your sense of rights come
from?
Participant. Once you start saying "if they are guaranteed not to be
discriminated against, but protected," then that sort of changes
the picture.
Professor Hannum That is a big "if." That is not a minority right,
particularly. I mean, that is what I suggested at the very end of my
speech-that most of these questions that appear to be minority
questions are not. They are basic, old-fashioned, human rights
questions.
Participant I am troubled at your suggestion that the principle of
self-determination should be forgotten. It seems to me that when
you have the difficulties involved in self-determination, the princi-
ple itself certainly has its place. That principle has crystallized
expectations and demands of people around the contemporary
world. I think what is important is that whenever a particular
group invokes the principle of self-determination, one should not
take that at face value. That is to say, when a group demands self-
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determination, that group may be thinking it would be great if
ideally it could make an independent state; or thinking it wants a
high degree of autonomy even within the present framework as it
has a whole range of demands; or thinking it simply wants lan-
guage rights or certain financial assistance for educational and reli-
gious institutions, and so on. In this regard, I do not think that
self-determination should be discarded.
The right of self-determination should be kept for whatever it
is; as a matter of fact, some people will interpret it as the right to
develop one's political, economic, social, and cultural affairs, both
in an external and an internal sense-internal self-determination
in the sense of permanent sovereignty. Some people try to distin-
guish economic sovereignty from noneconomic sovereignty, but I
think there is a hazard in invoking terms such as sovereignty.
Sovereignty, by definition, is a supreme authority; when the state
begins to assert supreme authority in the highly interdependent
world, it is an impossibility. Capital-importing countries, developing
countries, welcome investment. When the flow of capital comes,
they say they are not going to be dominated or influenced by
outside capital. But if the outside capital is not forthcoming, they
say they are being discriminated against. The realities of interde-
pendence cannot be resolved by the rhetoric of sovereignty, inde-
pendence, and such, but at each instance it is very important to
see what actual demands are made and what interests are at stake.
As observers, we do not take the partisan's advocacy at face
value; we simply see how it fits into the picture of how the com-
mon interests can be achieved. It seems to me that in today's
world there is room for invoking the principle of self-determina-
tion, but that principle definitely should not be used to encourage
fragmentation and chaos. That is why some of the questioners this
morning say that now you are taking so many factors into account
in determining viability. On the other hand, the reality of so many
groups asserting their particular rights is inherently antithetical to
the principle of democracy. If that is the case, I think we have to
pause long and hard; it seems to me that when we talk about
human dignity, we talk about human rights at the heart of it. This
is an area that needs genuine creativity. In a way, I agree that
general principles are very difficult to formulate; but on the other
hand, some situations call for very special protection. We do not
need to talk about autonomy with a whole range of arrange-
ments-it could be religious rights, linguistic rights, and so on, in
the particular situation. It seems to me that it is a difficult task,
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but all the elements can be harmonized in a way that would serve
the common interests.
Professor Hannu=: Well, I very much agree with your approach in
the sense of looking at real interests as opposed to theory. I would
be happy to abandon talking about sovereignty along with aban-
doning self-determination. On the point of participation, though, I
think it is important to recognize what sorts of minority demands
we have been discussing. They are not demands for participation
in most cases. They are demands for political power, and we may
well be sympathetic to them. We may, in some cases, want to
encourage them, but they are very different from demands for
participation. Part of democracy implies that if you lose, you lose.
We have developed a minimum floor of human rights, and we are
now trying to expand human rights slightly to include things like
language and perhaps education-things that used to be called
minority rights.
It is a very large jump from that approach to the develop-
ment of international guarantees for minority political power, and
I think that is really the essence here. It is important that we
focus on it and decide whether or not it is something that we
want to put forward. I am actually willing to support it once one
eliminates secession.
I think that it is time for international lawyers to bite the
bullet and say that the era of self-determination, insofar as it im-
plies that independence is at stake, is over. It may still happen.
Quebec in Canada may- decide to separate, or someone may win a
war somewhere and decide to separate. Otherwise, what self-deter-'
mination means is, perhaps, empowerment; is, perhaps, effective
participation; is, perhaps, political power. The only way we are
going to put that message across is to state up front that self-de-
termination will stop short of secession for independence. Seces-
sion is inherently political and has never been the legal norm.
Participant I was struck by the fact that you left out two recent
documents on indigenous rights.
Professor Hannumr: Not to cut you off, but I did leave those out
consciously, and we are going to talk about them a bit later. I
should say in passing that I do think they are very relevant, even
though indigenous peoples and minorities have been kept separate
in the discussion. Indigenous peoples have been much more suc-
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cessful at a much lower level, I think, in advancing a whole set of
rights that may well be relevant for minorities. It is related, but I
think that for this session we need to pass on it.
Participant: I just wanted to respond to your question about wheth-
er there is any real difference between group rights and individual
rights. If individual rights are adequately protected, then minori-
ties will have less of a need to call for group rights. But that is a
big "if." It seems to me that the real problem with individual
rights is that they always get set up against the greater good of
something else: the greater good of society, or the greater good of
the dominant group. Invariably, the rights of groups who do not
constitute the greater group are neglected. Such groups want
greater respect for their rights. They-want some trump over the
greater good. It seems to me that this is very much what ethnic
minorities are saying in the United States. They say that although
they are individuals like everybody else in the United States, they
just do not count in the greater collective. They want to articulate
their rights in a way so that they do count, and, therefore, they
want to be recognized as a group.
Professor Hannum: I think that is right. I want to reiterate my point
by noting that I have not yet heard an explanation of why blacks,
Hispanics, Catholics, or anybody else who is out of power and who
does not have effective access to power is any more important, is
any more significant, deserves any more trump, than I do. I have
not voted for a President who has won for a long time now.
There are many people in this country who believe in socialism,
or social democracy, and meaningful economic reforms in health
care, and this and that. They are a long way from coming into
power, and I do not know why a group that shares certain objec-
tive characteristics (if one can enforce equality and nondiscrimina-
tion, and that is a big "if," as that is very important) is deserving
of more respect than other groups that are effectively excluded
from power.
Participant You have presented a very interesting idea by answering
some questions. However, I cannot agree with the idea that there
are nations of the first sort, second sort, third sort, and fourth
sort. You see, I cannot accept the idea of inequality of nations and
ethnic groups. From my point of view, absolutely all people and
all ethnic groups, at least in their rights, are equal-and this is
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not dependent upon whether or not they were fast enough to
catch the train of sovereignty. That is why I cannot accept the
idea that the train of secession, in principle, is over, because fairly
recently one state seceded in a very original way. I mean, East
Germany seceded from itself. It seceded back to Germany.
The problem is that society can be divided on very different
bases. Society can be divided into plumbers, Republicans, profes-
sors, communists, and so on. I think that one criterion can still be
introduced, and perhaps it will help us both find a common
ground-namely, compromise. I think this right of self-determina-
tion is not only the right to get some professional, cultural, reli-
gious, and ethnic representation, but it is the right to acquire
political representation. There is little difference between different
ethnic minorities and different territories, where perhaps the right
to secede may be denied.
I think that the right of self-determination in Europe really
belongs to the nations at least in one place-in their ethnic terri-
tory of their national motherland. The Slovaks or Slovenians who
come to the United States cannot claim self-determination in Mas-
sachusetts or Minnesota. Still, I guess 'that Slovaks and Slovenians
have the right to have their political, economic, and ethnic rights
protected in one very small place in, the world-in their own
motherland, where they have lived for thousands of years. That is
what makes Slovaks different from carpenters, who can work in
the Soviet Union, in America, or anywhere else. If we introduce
this criterion, then at least the potential right to self-determine in
the way a group really pleases exists.
Professor Hannum I certainly agree with you that all nations should
have equal rights. What I disagree with is your assumption that
nations, however you define them, ever at any time in history have
enjoyed the legal right to independent statehood. That simply
never has been true. Maybe I am being overly positivistic, but it
simply is not the case. There are nations whose territories overlap.
It is very odd that when a nation claims a territory it seems to be
the territory that it had at its greatest height of power. It could
have been three centuries ago, but nevertheless they claim it as
theirs. They say it is what they want. Armenians and Kurds have
shared the same territory for centuries. Which is the homeland?
Do you dot it around here and there? Maybe Basques have satis-
fied their desires for self-determination, and maybe they have not.
I am willing, as is Professor Chen, to discus in a political context
1991]
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whether one particular claim for political power is more persuasive
than some other one. But to pretend that there is a norm of
international law, or that there should be, saying that all nations
have the right to a state, flies in the face of several thousands of
years of history, and certainly flies in the face of the law as it is
today. Maybe this is not the way it should be, but I do not think
there can be any debate that this is the way it is.
rofessor Lopez: Please join me in thanking Hurst for an excellent
presentation.
